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California’s enterprise zone program was established in 1986 to spur the creation of busi-nesses in economically distressed areas and to create job opportunities for economically disadvantaged workers. It is the state’s largest economic development program, offer-
ing tax credits and other incentives to businesses in 42 designated zones throughout the 
state. Yet, after more than 20 years, the program’s effects are still unclear. Little is required 
of the state or its local zones in the way of evaluation, and previous research studies of the 
program’s effects have had methodological problems, yielding suspect results. 
In this report, we assess the degree to which the program has met its most important 
goal: creating employment. We use a unique set of data and methods to measure employ-
ment in enterprise zones in each year from 1992 through 2004, construct appropriate control 
groups for comparison, and estimate the effect of the program on employment. 
Our main finding is that, on average, enterprise zones have no effect on business creation 
or job growth. However, our report also includes several findings and recommendations that 
may be useful in making enterprise zones more effective. 
We found that the program’s effectiveness differs across zones, appearing to have a more 
favorable effect on job creation in zones with smaller employment shares in manufacturing 
and in zones where the administrators report greater marketing and outreach activity. 
We encourage a more critical evaluation of the program overall and of its effects in individual 
zones, using both our metric—employment—and others, such as poverty, unemployment, 
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and property values. The state should evaluate individual zone success with consistent evalu-
ation metrics; this is an essential step for judging which factors make some zones more effec-
tive than others.
To increase the overall effectiveness of the program, zone selection should consider the 
characteristics that we have identified that may lead to more effective zones, zone admin-
istrators should be encouraged to engage in the activities that make zones more effective, 
and continuing evaluations should pay more attention to factors associated with success at 
creating jobs. 
Two relatively small changes would benefit future evaluation and administration of the 
program. The first would be to require that local zone administrators and applicants create 
digitized maps of their zones using geographic information system (GIS) software. GIS maps 
can be read with standard mapping software and overlaid with data from the U.S. Census, 
the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS), and other sources. The second change would 
be to require that enterprise zones follow Census tract boundaries. This would make it easier 
to analyze and control for demographic and other characteristics when selecting new zones 
or evaluating existing ones. These two recommended changes would help the California 
Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) in its zone selection and evalu-
ation process and enable local administrators to work more effectively with businesses in 
visualizing and marketing the zone.
 The full report and related resources  
are available on the report’s publication page: 
www.ppic.org/main/publication.asp?i=742.
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Introduction
California’s enterprise zone program represents the state’s 
primary policy effort to encourage local economic devel-
opment. However, there is considerable debate on the 
program’s effects on job creation and employment and 
on whether restructuring the program might enhance its 
effectiveness.1 The California Franchise Tax Board (2006) 
estimates the cost in terms of forgone tax revenue as  
$333 million in fiscal year 2005.2 However, in a period of 
severe fiscal difficulties, even relatively modest programs 
bear scrutiny. In April 2008, the Legislative Analyst’s 
Office (LAO) recommended scaling back the enterprise 
zone program to raise revenue, citing the program’s uncer-
tain economic benefits (LAO, 2008). On the other hand, in 
late 2008, the California Association for Local Economic 
Development (CALED) proposed expanding the program 
to help stimulate the state’s economy; implicit in this rec-
ommendation is a belief that the program helps create jobs 
(CALED, undated).3 Clearly there is little agreement on the 
program’s value.
In this report we answer the following questions: Does 
the enterprise zone program affect employment? If so, 
does the program affect employment more in certain types 
of businesses, such as manufacturing? How do program 
effects vary across zones? What factors influence the effect 
of enterprise zones on employment, and what does this 
mean for program design?
California’s enterprise zone program has several goals: 
attracting jobs and businesses and increasing local employ-
ment is one goal; improving welfare by lowering poverty 
and unemployment and raising incomes is another.4 In 
recent years, an increasingly important additional goal 
has been strengthening the institutional capacity of local 
economic development agencies. In this report, we focus 
only on the goal of increasing employment. Although it 
is difficult to see how the program could achieve its other 
goals, such as reducing poverty, without creating jobs, we 
stress that we are directly evaluating only one aspect of the 
program. Thus, our findings must be weighed against other 
research on the administration, design, costs, and effects 
of the program to arrive at a broader judgment of the 
program’s success. Nonetheless, the effect of the enterprise 
zone program on job creation strikes us as the most impor-
tant criterion for evaluating the program. In addition, our 
results have implications for the program’s design, which 
may prove informative in thinking about how to improve 
it. Other states and countries have similar programs and, 
although their details differ, lessons from California’s 
enterprise zone program will improve our general under-
standing of the effects of geographically targeted economic 
development programs.
The most important criterion for evaluating the enterprise zones program 
is its effect on job creation. 
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In conducting our analysis, we use the NETS database, 
which provides employment and exact location data for 
nearly all business establishments in California from 1992 
to 2004. We also construct a precise geographic database 
of existing enterprise zones—a complex exercise that we 
believe represents a significant improvement in the mea-
surement of areas affected by the policy. These databases, 
combined with our spatial and statistical methods, allow 
us to overcome important limitations of previous research 
on the effects of enterprise zone programs.
We also conducted interviews with local administra-
tors of the enterprise zone program. In these interviews, 
we asked about the goals of the program, the activities of 
local zone administrators, and the main challenges they 
face, among other questions. We use their responses to 
supplement the business establishment data in the NETS to 
assess whether local zone activities influence the effect of 
the program on jobs.
In the following pages, we describe California’s enter-
prise zone program, including its goals and incentives. 
We also describe the 42 enterprise zones in California and 
their selection process. We then explain our approach and 
present our results. In particular, we describe the extensive 
process of mapping enterprise zones and estimating the 
program’s effectiveness. Finally, we discuss our findings 
and present our conclusions. We provide more extensive 
details and methodological explanations in a series of  
technical appendices, which we refer to throughout the  
text and which are available on the PPIC website. 
Program Goals and Incentives
The goals of the enterprise zone program are to increase 
employment and incomes and to reduce unemployment  
and poverty. These multiple goals—job creation and improv-
ing households’ economic circumstances—stem from the 
1996 merger of two precursor programs that gave rise to 
the current enterprise zone program. These were the Enter-
prise Zone Act, which provided incentives to businesses in 
specific areas (and which led to the creation of the original 
enterprise zones), and the Employment and Economic 
Incentive Act, which provided incentives to businesses that 
hired employees living in distressed residential areas.5 
In this report we focus on the creation of jobs, for 
two reasons.6 First, job creation is arguably a prerequisite 
for the second goal, improving residents’ circumstances. 
Second, in our survey of local zone managers, described 
below, nearly all respondents cited job or business creation 
when we asked about the purpose of the enterprise zone 
program; far fewer cited improving residents’ welfare.
The program seeks to accomplish its goals by provid-
ing a variety of tax incentives to businesses in designated 
areas to encourage the hiring of economically disadvan-
taged workers and to spur the creation of businesses. 
Businesses in enterprise zones may claim a tax credit of up 
to 50 percent of a new “disadvantaged” employee’s annual 
wages (up to 150% of the minimum wage) in the first year 
in which they are employed, 40 percent in the second year, 
and so on down to 10 percent in the fifth year. Workers 
qualify as “disadvantaged” if they are unemployed for 
a sufficient duration, or for certain other reasons—for 
example, if they have sufficiently low income, if they belong 
to one of several “eligibility groups” (veteran, enrolled in  
welfare-to-work, etc.), or if they live in a “targeted employ-
ment area (TEA).”7 This hiring tax credit—worth up to 
$36,000 per qualified worker over the five-year period— 
is the largest incentive that the enterprise zone program 
offers. This incentive is clearly intended to encourage busi-
nesses in enterprise zones to hire economically disadvan-
taged workers. Moreover, this credit reduces the cost of hir-
ing labor and hence ought to increase overall employment. 
The program offers four other incentives: (1) an income 
tax credit for sales or use taxes for machinery or parts used  
within the zone, (2) a longer period (15 years versus 10 years) 
in which businesses can carry forward net operating losses 
into future years to reduce tax liabilities, (3) accelerated 
depreciation of depreciable property, and (4) a tax credit 
that low-income employees may claim, up to a maximum 
and subject to restrictions on work for the business in the 
zone and services performed within the zone.8 Each of 
these incentives is intended to reduce the tax burden or 
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cost of doing business in enterprise zones, which might 
be expected to spur the creation of new businesses or the 
expansion of existing ones. In addition, businesses in 
enterprise zones can sometimes receive preferential treat-
ment on state contracts.9 And financial lenders may deduct 
from their income the net interest received from loans 
made to businesses in enterprise zones. 
Description of Zones
The enterprise zone program allows for up to 42 zones in 
the state. HCD can conduct an application process when 
the number of zones falls below the maximum, whether 
as a result of zones expiring or being de-designated or 
because the legislature increases the maximum number of 
zones. Ten enterprise zones were created at the program’s 
inception in 1986; since then, legislation has increased the 
number to 42. Zones are designated for an initial 15-year 
term, after which five-year extensions can be granted. After 
the 15- or 20-year period, the enterprise zone expires and a 
new application must be submitted. 
As noted above, 42 enterprise zones had been des-
ignated as of the end of our sample period, although we 
could not obtain the information on all of them that is 
required for our mapping and empirical analysis. Table 1 
lists the zones for which we were able to obtain this infor-
mation; the table notes list the zones not included in this 
study because the information was not available.10 The table 
also lists the year in which each zone was initially desig-
nated (for those zones for which we have full information), 
and the number of times that the zone expanded.11 
Tables 2 and 3 describe the size of each zone overall 
and relative to other standards; these tables include only 
zones for which we have full information. Table 2, col-
umn 1, reports employment in each enterprise zone in our 
sample as of 2004. Column 2 reports the share of each zone 
in overall enterprise zone employment (that is, as a share of 
employment in the enterprise zones we study). 
At the bottom of Table 2, we provide some additional 
information that is useful in thinking about the impor-
tance of enterprise zones and in thinking about our sample. 
Overall employment in the enterprise zones included in 
our study is about 1.38 million. Employment in the control 
rings used in our empirical analysis (extending 1,000 feet 
from the zone boundaries, as explained below) is about 
580,000. Overall employment in the counties in which the 
zones we study are located is 12.6 million, so that enterprise 
zone employment represents about 11 percent of the total. 
Overall employment in all counties with enterprise zones—
whether or not we could construct maps for those zones—
was about 14.2 million. Thus, if we assume that the share 
of county employment represented by enterprise zones is 
the same in the counties for which we have the requisite 
information as for the counties for which we do not, then 
our enterprise zones represent 89 percent (12.6/14.2) of 
enterprise zone employment in the state.
Columns 3 to 5 provide information on enterprise zone 
employment relative to county and statewide employment.12 
Measured enterprise zone employment represents 8.4 per-
cent of statewide employment and, as noted above, about 
11 percent of employment in the counties with zones. But 
these shares differ a good deal across counties. For example, 
the share of enterprise zone employment in county employ-
ment differs from a high of 52.8 percent in Shasta Metro to 
a low of 0.7 percent in Altadena/Pasadena. Finally, column 5  
indicates that the large zones (Los Angeles, San Francisco, 
Santa Ana, and Oakland) each account, on their own, for  
1 percent or more of total statewide employment. 
Table 3 reports similar information for establishments.13 
For ease of comparison with Table 2, the enterprise zones 
are again ordered by 2004 employment; the order of zones 
by number of establishments is nearly the same. Over-
all, the establishments in the enterprise zones we study 
account for 6.5 percent of the statewide total and 8.7 per-
cent in the counties in which they are located. 
The 42 zones in California’s enterprise zone program 
include a wide variety of places and local economies. The 
zones range from dense urban centers to rural areas. Some 
are in affluent counties, whereas others are in some of the 
state’s poorest counties. The industry composition of zones 
differs as well. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for a 
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Designation year No. of zone expansions 
Altadena/Pasadena 1992 1
Bakersfield 1986 3
Coachella Valleya 1992 2
Delano 1991 1
Eureka 1986 1
Lindsay 1997 0
Long Beach 1992 1
Los Angelesb ... 14
Los Angeles, Central City 1986
Los Angeles, East Side 1988
Los Angeles, Harbor Area 1989
Los Angeles, Mid-Alameda Corridor 1986
Los Angeles, Northeast Valley 1986
Madera 1989 0
Merced 1991 1
Oakland 1993 1
Oroville 1991 1
Porterville 1985 0
Richmond 1992 1
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and Army Depot 1989 2
Sacramento, Northgate/Norwood 1989 2
San Diego, Barrio Logan 1987 2
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa 1991 3
San Francisco 1992 4
San Jose 1986 1
Santa Ana 1993 1
Shafter 1995 0
Shasta Metro 1991 2
Shasta Valley 1993 0
West Sacramento 1988 0
Yuba/Sutter 1986 4
SOURCES: www.caez.org/Programs/Map_of_CA_Zones.html; street address changes are taken from street files, found in California Department of Housing and Community Development (undated-a); Assembly 
Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy Committee (2006).
NOTES: In some cases, the sources listed above provided different start dates. In cases of such discrepancies, we checked with zone administrators to verify the start date. The zones not studied, and their  
designation years, are Agua Mansa (1986), Antelope Valley (1997), Calexico (1986), Fresno (1986), Kings County (1993), Pittsburg (1988), Stockton (1993), Watsonville (1997), Barstow (2005), Imperial Valley (2005), 
and Stanislaus (2005).
aBecause the Coachella zone started in late 1991 (November 10), we use 1992 as the first year. 
bThe five Los Angeles zones are treated as one large zone for the analysis. 
Table 1. California enterprise zones studied
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Enterprise zones,  
ranked by employment
No. employed  
in zone 
Col. 1 % of zone  
employment   
in state
No. employed  
in county 
Col. 1 % of county 
employment
Col. 1 % of state 
employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Los Angeles 274,434 19.9 4,677,221 5.9 1.7
San Francisco 215,329 15.6 600,488 35.9 1.3
Santa Ana 175,018 12.7 1,733,164 10.1 1.1
Oakland 163,181 11.9 775,214 21.0 1.0
Long Beach 121,754 8.8 4,677,221 2.6 0.7
San Jose 98,162 7.1 984,246 10.0 0.6
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and 
Army Depot 40,832 3.0 624,638 6.5 0.2
Shasta Metro 40,178 2.9 76,069 52.8 0.2
Altadena/Pasadena 33,956 2.5 4,677,221 0.7 0.2
San Diego, Barrio Logan 28,624 2.1 1,440,987 2.0 0.2
West Sacramento 24,779 1.8 85,538 29.0 0.2
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa 24,196 1.8 1,440,987 1.7 0.1
Yuba/Sutter 21,853 1.6 47,581 45.9 0.1
Richmond 20,567 1.5 389,983 5.3 0.1
Eureka 18,065 1.3 50,442 35.8 0.1
Sacramento, Northgate/
Norwood 15,279 1.1 624,638 2.4 0.1
Coachella Valley 11,050 0.8 586,101 1.9 0.1
Madera 9,765 0.7 38,635 25.3 0.1
Oroville 8,954 0.7 81,353 11.0 0.1
Bakersfield 8,829 0.6 242,303 3.6 0.1
Delano 6,212 0.5 242,303 2.6 0.0
Shasta Valley 5,818 0.4 18,777 31.0 0.0
Shafter 3,695 0.3 242,303 1.5 0.0
Lindsay 2,758 0.2 123,101 2.2 0.0
Porterville 2,633 0.2 123,101 2.1 0.0
Merced 641 0.0 68,050 0.9 0.0
No. employed in all zones 1,376,562    8.4
No. employed in control rings 579,845    3.5
No. employed in all counties 
with zones in our sample 12,643,891     
No. employed in all counties 
with enterprise zones 14,186,945     
No. employed statewide 16,441,979     
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on NETS data and enterprise zone maps. 
NOTES: The figures are reported for the complete area of each zone as of 2004. In cases where a zone is mainly in one county but also extends into another, in this table the zone is assigned to the county in which 
most of the zone is located. 
Table 2. Enterprise zone employment, 2004
Do California’s Enterprise Zones Create Jobs?8
www.ppic.org
Enterprise zones,  
ranked by employment
No. of  
establishments  
in zone
Col. 1 % of zone 
establishments  
in state
No. of  
establishments 
 in county
Col. 1 % of  
establishments  
in county 
Col. 1 % of  
establishments  
in state 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Los Angeles 27,750 22.3 542,239 5.1 1.5
San Francisco 18,894 15.2 58,482 32.3 1.0
Santa Ana 13,341 10.7 201,444 6.6 0.7
Oakland 15,735 12.7 79,541 19.8 0.8
Long Beach 9,730 7.8 542,239 1.8 0.5
San Jose 8,571 6.9 95,321 9.0 0.4
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and  
Army Depot 2,795 2.2 62,598 4.5 0.1
Shasta Metro 4,157 3.3 10,643 39.1 0.2
Altadena/Pasadena 4,029 3.2 542,239 0.7 0.2
San Diego, Barrio Logan 2,261 1.8 168,061 1.3 0.1
West Sacramento 1,806 1.5 8,219 22.0 0.1
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa 2,543 2.0 168,061 1.5 0.1
Yuba/Sutter 2,140 1.7 6,065 35.3 0.1
Richmond 1,765 1.4 51,011 3.5 0.1
Eureka 1,831 1.5 6,736 27.2 0.1
Sacramento, Northgate/Norwood 1,013 0.8 62,598 1.6 0.1
Coachella Valley 1,204 1.0 73,996 1.6 0.1
Madera 834 0.7 4,952 16.8 0.0
Oroville 959 0.8 11,979 8.0 0.1
Bakersfield 570 0.5 27,900 2.0 0.0
Delano 733 0.6 27,900 2.6 0.0
Shasta Valley 671 0.5 3,331 20.1 0.0
Shafter 339 0.3 27,900 1.2 0.0
Lindsay 312 0.3 14,622 2.1 0.0
Porterville 184 0.1 14,622 1.3 0.0
Merced 122 0.1 7,218 1.7 0.0
No. of establishments in all zones 124,289    6.5
No. of establishments in control rings 58,069    3.0
No. of establishments in all  
counties with zones in our sample 1,434,358     
No. of establishments in all  
counties with enterprise zones 1,614,114     
No. of establishments statewide 1,912,173     
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on NETS data and enterprise zone maps.
NOTES: The figures are reported for the complete area of each zone as of 2004. In cases where a zone is mainly in one county but also extends into another, in this table the zone is assigned to the county in which 
most of the zone is located. 
Table 3. Enterprise zone establishments, 2004
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Enterprise zones,  
ranked by employment
No. employed  
in zone, 2004
No. employed  
per square mile  
in zone, 1992
% employed 
 in manufacturing, 
1992
% employed  
in establishments 
with < 50  
employees, 1992
% with college 
degree in county, 
1990
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Los Angeles 274,434 5,062 28.8 40.4 22.3
San Francisco 215,329 22,813 9.2 44.2 35.0
Santa Ana 175,018 19,919 20.9 39.3 27.8
Oakland 163,181 5,854 12.9 41.7 28.8
Long Beach 121,754 8,285 11.2 46.9 22.3
San Jose 98,162 8,787 12.5 46.1 32.6
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and 
Army Depot 40,832 4,285 15.7 42.4 23.0
Shasta Metro 40,178 1,059 9.4 51.3 13.7
Altadena/Pasadena 33,956 8,744 10.4 44.8 22.3
San Diego, Barrio Logan 28,624 5,085 22.0 51.3 25.3
West Sacramento 24,779 1,673 11.1 46.9 30.3
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa 24,196 1,658 34.8 46.5 25.3
Yuba/Sutter 21,853 487 16.2 52.0 12.5
Richmond 20,567 3,561 17.4 47.3 31.6
Eureka 18,065 4,843 3.2 56.2 20.0
Sacramento, Northgate/Norwood 15,279 7,790 11.2 48.9 23.0
Coachella Valley 11,050 298 6.0 48.7 14.6
Madera 9,765 2,176 34.4 47.3 11.7
Oroville 8,954 1,006 11.3 48.8 19.5
Bakersfield 8,829 1,516 9.8 50.8 13.3
Delano 6,212 1,239 2.6 58.7 13.3
Shasta Valley 5,818 1,395 6.3 62.3 14.2
Shafter 3,695 786 3.6 73.4 13.3
Lindsay 2,758 1,331 21.0 55.1 11.8
Porterville 2,633 2,014 40.6 34.6 11.8
Merced 641 119 1.9 89.9 12.0
Total 1,376,562 5,052 14.8 50.6 20.4
SOURCE: Authors’ computations based on NETS data, enterprise zone maps, and the U.S. Census.
NOTES: The figures are reported for the complete area of each zone as of 2004. In cases where a zone is mainly in one county but also extends into another, in this table the zone is assigned to the county in which 
most of the zone is located. 
Table 4. Descriptive information on enterprise zones
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range of economic and demographic factors.14 As already 
noted, zones range in employment size from under 1,000 
(Merced) to over 200,000 (San Francisco and Los Angeles). 
These larger zones do not necessarily cover more land area, 
so the density of employment per square mile differs consid-
erably. Zones covering downtown areas, as in San Francisco 
and Santa Ana, show densities of well over 10,000 workers 
per square mile; at the other extreme, the Coachella Valley, 
Merced, Shafter, and Yuba/Sutter zones all have an employ-
ment density of fewer than 1,000 workers per square mile.
The composition of employment differs, too. Manufac-
turing accounts for more than one-third of employment in 
the Madera, Porterville, and San Diego Ysidro/Otay Mesa 
zones but less than 10 percent of employment in several 
zones. Nearly 90 percent of employees work in establish-
ments with fewer than 50 employees in the Merced zone, 
whereas fewer than half of employees work in small estab-
lishments in many zones, especially larger zones. 
Finally, the demographics of the labor markets that 
enterprise zones draw from may vary. We are unable to 
measure the demographic characteristics of the residents of 
zones, since the NETS does not include such data. But this 
inability may not represent much of a limitation, because 
there is no reason to believe that enterprise zone employees 
are enterprise zone residents. As we noted above, many 
other groups—including, since 1997, all residents of other 
nearby areas of socioeconomic disadvantage (the TEAs)—
are eligible for the hiring credit. In counties containing 
enterprise zones, the share of adults with college degrees 
in 1990 ranges from 35 percent in San Francisco County 
and 33 percent in Santa Clara County (which contains the 
San Jose zone) to 11.8 percent in Tulare (which contains the 
Lindsay and Porterville zones).15 
Selection of Zones
Localities apply to HCD to have a geographic area desig-
nated as an enterprise zone. The eligibility criteria include 
measures of residential income, unemployment, and pov-
erty, as well as other indicators. New zones are selected by 
HCD from the eligible areas based on these and other fac-
tors, including the local applicant’s plan for bundling other 
local incentives, administering the program, and evaluating 
the outcome.16 In the 2006 application round, for instance, 
an area was eligible for consideration as an enterprise zone 
if it included a residential portion sufficiently “distressed” 
(as measured by income level, income growth, unemploy-
ment, and poverty) or petitioned for “distressed” status on 
the basis of plant closures, gang violence, or other mea-
sures.17 The proposed zone also had to include an industrial 
or commercial area “contiguous or adjacent to” the dis-
tressed area.18 In addition, the applicants for enterprise zone 
status were required to prepare an economic development 
plan (including marketing, finance, and administration of 
the plan; other local incentives; infrastructure development 
plans; and information management). This new applica-
tion process weighted localities’ economic development 
strategies more heavily than in the past and required that 
localities identify development objectives, rather than using 
program-wide evaluation measures.19 
Program Assessments 
Since enterprise zones represent the state’s largest eco-
nomic development program, numerous groups have 
assessed the program’s effectiveness.20 Their studies 
provide important context for our research: Some of these 
studies looked, as we do, at the effect of the program on 
jobs, but used a less-satisfactory methodology; others 
looked at different effects or at the detailed workings of the 
program and are important context for our study.
The California Research Bureau (CRB) published a 
study of the effect of the program on employment, wages, 
and the number of firms (O’Keefe and Dunstan, 2001). 
This study is the most similar to ours in that it asks similar 
questions. It compares the growth in Census tracts covered 
by enterprise zones with demographically similar Census 
tracts, using 1990 Census data to select one matched tract 
for each Census tract in a zone. The authors found that 
employment growth between 1991 and 1999 in enterprise 
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zones established before 1990 far exceeds growth in the 
matched tracts, although the eff ect in enterprise zones 
established between 1990 and 1995 was much smaller, as 
was the eff ect on average monthly earnings per worker. 
In fact, monthly earnings growth was lower in enterprise 
zones established between 1990 and 1995 than in matched 
tracts. Further, the authors found considerable variation 
in the eff ects on growth in employment, earnings, and the 
number of fi rms across zones.
We fi nd the authors’ methodology problematic on 
two counts. First, they used data aggregated at the Census 
tract level, but California’s enterprise zones do not follow 
Census tract boundaries, so using tract-level data gives 
only an approximate picture of employment trends inside 
and outside enterprise zones. Second, they selected their 
control group tracts using 1990 Census data even though 
zones were created before 1990; it would have been prefer-
able to have identifi ed similar “matched” tracts based on 
data from before the start of the program.21 Despite these 
problems, their results were the basis for a cost-benefi t 
analysis published by the California Association of Enter-
prise Zones (CAEZ), authored by Bradshaw (2003).22 He 
calculated the increase in personal income taxes, sales 
taxes, and corporate income taxes paid to the state as a 
result of the increased employment in enterprise zones 
and found that these increased revenues outweighed the 
program’s costs.23 However, Bradshaw’s fi ndings are subject 
to the same concerns as those we raise above about O’Keefe 
and Dunstan’s results, bringing into question his overall 
conclusion about the program’s net fi scal benefi t.
A report sponsored by HCD (Nonprofi t Management 
Solutions and Tax Technology Research, 2006) looked at 
a related concern: the eff ect of enterprise zones on neigh-
borhood poverty, income, rents, and vacancy rates.24 Th at 
study found that household economic and neighborhood 
housing indicators generally improve in enterprise zones 
relative to neighboring areas and the rest of the state. How-
ever, this study, like the CRB study, also used questionable 
control groups: It compared Census tracts in enterprise 
zones with adjacent tracts, although these were not nec-
essarily similar in any other way to enterprise zones. It 
also misrepresented the mechanics of the enterprise zone 
program, claiming that “if industrial growth occurs in an 
EZ area, it should also manifest itself in economic growth 
for individuals living in the same area” (p. 1). In fact, as 
outlined above, since 1997, businesses in an enterprise zone 
have been able to claim hiring credits for employees living 
in a TEA or meeting other eligibility criteria. However, 
residence in the enterprise zone itself—which need not 
include the TEA—does not qualify a worker for the hir-
ing credit. Consequently, if enterprise zones have positive 
eff ects on individuals and families in any particular areas, 
these eff ects should be more apparent in targeted employ-
ment areas than in enterprise zones. Th e reports reviewed 
so far reveal some of the methodological challenges of 
assessing the enterprise zone program as well as the impor-
tance of understanding the program’s intended eff ects.
In two reports that question numerous aspects of 
the design of the enterprise zone program, the California 
Budget Project (CBP) assesses the studies cited above and 
the enterprise zone program’s eff ectiveness generally. Th e 
reports criticize all the above studies for not focusing on 
employment eff ects specifi cally on businesses that used the 
program’s tax credits.25 We think this criticism is misguided, 
because it ignores the fact that local economic development 
Zone eligibility criteria include measures of residential income, 
unemployment, and poverty.
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incentives are supposed to accompany state-level tax  
incentives as part of the enterprise zone program, so the tax 
credits are not the only mechanism by which the program 
could raise employment; and the other enterprise zone ben-
efits could affect firms regardless of whether they claim tax 
credits. CBP also criticizes the design of the enterprise zone 
program, in part for how it targets benefits. CBP’s reports 
point out that relatively well-off cities, such as San Francisco 
and Los Angeles, receive far more benefits than poorer rural 
areas, and that well-paid workers qualify for hiring credits 
as long as they live in targeted employment areas (Califor-
nia Budget Project, 2006a). CBP recommends restricting 
zone designations and expansions to include only “the most 
economically distressed communities” (2006a, p. 14). But, as 
argued above, the areas where the state’s neediest people live 
are not necessarily the areas where the enterprise zone pro-
gram could create the most jobs for the neediest employees. 
Conversely, areas that are currently not distressed could be 
formerly distressed areas where the enterprise zone program 
produced positive effects in the past.26
Unlike the CBP and HCD reports, our study focuses 
on the most important goal of the enterprise zone pro-
gram: job creation. Although these other studies raise 
important questions about the enterprise zone program, 
we think that any assessment should begin with the fun-
damental question of whether employment grows faster in 
enterprise zones than in appropriately defined comparison 
areas. O’Keefe and Dunstan (2001) do examine this ques-
tion but their study leaves considerable room for improve-
ment. Below, we explain our methodology in some detail, 
since it distinguishes our work from other assessments of 
the program, and then we present our findings.
Mapping Enterprise Zones  
and Businesses
In this study, we measure the effects of enterprise zones 
by precisely mapping the zones and identifying which 
California businesses fall inside and outside the zones. 
We then track the areas inside and outside the zones over 
time, comparing employment growth inside the zones to 
employment growth in appropriate control groups. We 
conduct similar analyses for changes in the number of 
establishments. Our methods improve on previous analy-
ses of enterprise zones in California, discussed above, and 
on academic studies of enterprise zone programs generally, 
discussed in Technical Appendix A.
To identify zone boundaries precisely, we map Cali- 
fornia’s enterprise zones street by street rather than by 
approximating with Census tracts, zip codes, or other geo-
graphic designations. Of course, the geographic contours 
of enterprise zones that we create are useful only if we can 
map business establishments or employment into them.  
We can do this using the NETS, a national, longitudinal file 
of the universe of business establishments created by Walls 
& Associates using establishment-level data from Dun & 
Bradstreet. The NETS provides exact street addresses for 
establishments in every year, allowing us to identify pre-
cisely whether a business is inside an enterprise zone in a 
given year. To determine whether an individual establish-
ment is in an enterprise zone in a given year, we undertook 
two data-intensive tasks: We geocoded establishments using 
address information in the NETS27 and we digitized enter-
prise zone maps. We describe these processes, which rely 
heavily on GIS software, in Technical Appendix B.
Estimating the Ef fects  
of Enterprise Zones
Because economic conditions can differ dramatically 
within cities, we use two types of comparison areas with 
which to contrast areas included in enterprise zones. First, 
we choose a fixed geographic area near the outer boundary 
of an enterprise zone—within 1,000 feet—on the presump-
tion that economic conditions and factors affecting the 
enterprise zone and this “control ring,” aside from the 
effects of the enterprise zone, are likely to be very similar. 
Second, we use areas that are later added to enterprise 
zones as control groups for areas original to (or added ear-
lier to) the same enterprise zone, taking advantage of the 
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fact that many of California’s enterprise zones expanded 
numerous times (Table 1). 
We analyze the effect of the program in two ways. 
First, we compare employment growth in enterprise zones 
at the time of designation or expansion with (1) employ-
ment growth in areas added to the zone earlier and later 
and with (2) employment growth in the outside control 
ring. The second way we analyze the program effect is by 
comparing employment growth in the initial zone desig-
nation and in later expansions, omitting the control rings 
from the analysis. We prefer this second type of compari-
son because areas that are added to enterprise zones later 
presumably have economic conditions that are similar 
to those of the area initially designated as the enterprise 
zone—they are potentially more similar than areas in 
the control ring that never became part of the enterprise 
zone.28 In both approaches, we estimate the effects of enter-
prise zones by comparing changes in outcomes in areas 
newly designated to areas whose status did not change.
To estimate the effect of the program across all zones, 
we use a regression framework, explained in Technical 
Appendix C, which essentially averages experiences across 
all zones and years. Our models account for the possibility 
of different growth rates over time for the area encompass-
ing an enterprise zone and its control ring; for differences 
in enterprise zones (or parts thereof) that change little over 
time, such as proximity to infrastructure or the educa-
tion level of residents; and for other possible confounding 
effects. We consider the possibility that enterprise zones 
lead to a relatively sharp one-time shift in employment 
rather than to a change in the rate of job creation, and we 
consider the possible overlap of enterprise zones with other 
geographically targeted policies, such as redevelopment 
areas.29 
We examine the effects of enterprise zones on both 
employment levels and number of establishments. We 
also evaluate how enterprise zones affect the composition 
of employment. Because the size of the hiring credit per 
worker is capped, firms in industries that hire lower-wage 
workers would see their labor costs reduced by a higher 
percentage than would firms in high-wage industries.30 
Also, the program’s tax incentives that target machinery 
and property are most likely to benefit manufacturing 
enterprises, so we examine whether enterprise zones affect 
the share of employment in manufacturing.
It is important to look at the time line of enterprise zone 
effects. The effects of enterprise zones may vary over their 
life cycle, and this is potentially significant for the structure 
of enterprise zone policy. If, for example, zones have most of 
their positive effect in the first five years of their existence, 
then a policy that creates the zone for a period of 15 years 
with a simple extension to 20 years, and which caps the 
number of zones (meaning that new zones can be designated 
only when existing zones are de-designated), may be mis-
guided. On the other hand, because enterprise zone designa-
tion requires a local economic development strategy, some of 
the effects, such as zoning relief, might take several years to 
have an effect on employment. Without necessarily identify-
ing the reasons for differences in the time line of enterprise 
zone effects, some of the specifications we estimate attempt 
to pin down this time line.
Finally, we assess whether the enterprise zone program 
does a better job at raising employment in some zones than 
in others. California’s enterprise zones are diverse: They 
have different local economic development strategies and 
different local economic conditions, both of which could 
influence the effectiveness of the program. Local economic 
development strategies could have effects, because zones 
are required to develop strategies as part of their applica-
tion for zone designation. Although the tax incentives 
offered by the state are uniform across enterprise zones, 
local zone administrators oversee marketing strategies for 
making businesses aware of the tax benefits and for coor-
dinating complementary local incentives. To characterize 
the variation in local economic development strategies and 
local resources devoted to the program, we conducted a 
survey in 2007 of enterprise zone administrators, based on 
which we constructed quantitative measures of comple-
mentary local involvement that are incorporated into the 
empirical analyses described below.
The effects of enterprise zones could also differ owing 
to diversity in employment density, the industry mix, local 
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demographics, other public investments, and so on. Cred-
its on sales tax for machinery purchases, for instance, are 
likely to have a larger effect on manufacturing firms than 
on services firms, and certain areas may be more amenable 
to manufacturing development than others. The hiring 
credit, too, could have a differential effect if firms in some 
industries can more easily employ disadvantaged workers. 
In our analysis, therefore, we include a short list of mea-
sures that could influence the effectiveness of the program 
at the zone level. 
Enterprise Zone Ef fects on 
Employment and Establishments
Our primary analyses examine the effects of enterprise 
zones on employment and number of establishments. 
Although our main interest is employment growth, the 
results on number of establishments are of interest for two 
reasons. First, they tell us whether enterprise zone incen-
tives are leading to the creation of more business establish-
ments. Second, the combined evidence on employment and 
establishments tells us how the size distribution of estab-
lishments is changing: For example, if there are no employ-
ment effects but fewer establishments, then establishments 
must be getting larger. 
In Table 5, we present some descriptive statistics on 
the size of enterprise zones—both initial designations and 
expansions—and the control rings for 1992, the first year 
of the sample.31 Enterprise zone employment constitutes 
about 69 percent of total employment in the zones and 
the control rings, and of this, about 72 percent is in the 
areas originally designated as part of the zones. Estab-
lishment size in the zones and the control rings is quite 
similar (approximately 14.5 employees per establishment), 
although sizes are slightly larger in the enterprise zone 
expansion areas than in the originally designated areas. 
The same is true of the share of employees in low-wage 
industries.32 The share in manufacturing is somewhat 
higher in the zone expansion areas and somewhat lower in 
the control rings. We conclude that the three types of areas 
we compare in our analysis—initial designations, expan-
sion areas, and control rings—are broadly similar in their 
characteristics. In our regression analysis, we control for 
initial or time-invariant differences between the areas and 
also examine evidence on any differences in such factors as 
prior trends in employment or job growth in the periods 
leading up to enterprise zone designations or expansions. 
We then show how the growth in jobs and number of 
establishments compares in areas before and after being 
designated as part of an enterprise zone. To better explain 
how we do this, we need to introduce what we call “sub-
zones,” which are the portions into which each enterprise 
zone can be divided, consisting of the area initially desig-
nated as the zone, each additional expansion, and the con-
trol ring. If, for instance, an enterprise zone was designated 
in 1994, expanded in 1998, and expanded again in 2001, we 
would have four subzones once we add the control ring to 
the initially designated area and the two expansion areas. 
Table 6 ignores the control rings, focusing only on  
the subzones that ever became part of the enterprise zone. 
The row labeled “difference in growth rates” suggests that 
enterprise zones slightly reduced the growth of jobs, with a 
fairly small relative difference of 0.5 percent slower growth 
in enterprise zones. In other words, subzone employment 
grew slightly slower after the subzone was designated as 
part of the enterprise zone. In contrast, enterprise zones 
appear to have slightly increased the growth rate in the 
number of establishments.33 
Our main finding is that enterprise zones have no sta-
tistically significant effect on either employment levels or 
Our main finding is that  
enterprise zones have no statistically  
significant effect on either employment levels 
or employment growth rates. 
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Whole sample
all areas  
ever in zones
areas in  
original zones
areas in  
zone expansions
1,000-foot  
control ring
Total no. employed 1,953,220 1,349,629 976,119 373,510 603,591
Total no. of establishments 140,969 96,752 71,006 25,746 44,217
No. of employees per  
establishment (weighted mean) 14.6 14.7 14.2 16.2 14.3
% of employees in low-wage 
industries (weighted mean) 11.6 11.8 11.6 12.4 10.9
% of employees in manufacturing 
(weighted mean) 8.0 8.6 7.8 10.8 6.7
Table 5. Statistics for enterprise zones and control rings, 1992
Table 6. Employment and establishment growth, within-zone comparisons (weighted by 1992 levels)
Employment Establishments
Enterprise subzones after zone designation
Average annual % change, year of designation to 2004 0.3 2.1
Enterprise subzones before zone designation
Average annual % change, 1992 to year of designation 0.8 1.8
Difference in growth rates, after versus before zone designation
Difference between two rows, above –0.5 0.3
Effect of enterprise zone program on growth rates
Main regression results –0.7 –0.8**
NOTES: There is one observation for each year for each subzone. Only areas ever included in enterprise zones in the sample period are included in this table. Our main regression results are from Technical 
Appendix D, Table A.3, Panel A, columns 3 and 4. We present them as percentage point changes in the table above, for consistency with the descriptive statistics in the other rows of the table. ** Indicates that the 
estimate is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
employment growth rates; the last row of Table 6 presents 
the effect on growth rates that we estimate using regres-
sion analysis. This finding holds up even with numerous 
additional tests. As described in Technical Appendix D, 
we find no consistent, statistically significant effect on 
employment when using alternative definitions of the 
control rings; including streets that appeared to us to be 
erroneously omitted from the official list of streets in the 
zones; changing the weighting of the regressions; allowing 
for different effects beginning in 1997, when TEA residents 
became eligible for the hiring credit; or omitting the Los 
Angeles zones, which account for many of the expansions 
we observe. We also found no difference in the effect of 
initial designations and subsequent expansions.
The effect on the growth rate of the number of estab-
lishments is negative, although statistically significant, in 
only some of the many different estimations we examine. 
One possible interpretation of the decline in the number 
of establishments coupled with no change in employ-
ment, which, as noted above, implies that establishments 
are becoming larger, is that there are fixed costs to taking 
advantage of enterprise zone benefits, and large establish-
ments (or firms) are therefore more likely to find enterprise 
zone benefits more attractive. If this interpretation is valid, 
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it may have implications for the effects of enterprise zone 
policy on entrepreneurship in the form of small business 
creation. We stress, though, that the negative effect on 
establishments is not as statistically robust as the absence 
of any effect on employment. We cannot say conclusively 
whether the program has either (1) a negative effect on the 
number of establishments (and therefore a positive effect 
on average establishment size) or (2) no effect on the num-
ber of establishments or on average establishment size.
The program has no statistically significant effect on 
employment even when a longer period of time is exam-
ined. Figure 1 shows the effects of the program on employ-
ment in the years before and after an area becomes part 
of an enterprise zone. The dots show our estimate of the 
effect, and the short bars show the confidence interval: A 
result is “statistically significant” if the dot as well as the 
entire area between the upper and lower bar is either above 
or below the horizontal line indicating “zero.” Clearly, 
the program does not have a statistically significant effect 
on employment growth during either the year an area is 
designated or in any of the following years. We also look 
back to years before designation to see whether areas that 
were later designated as part of an enterprise zone showed 
different growth patterns before designation or whether 
businesses changed their hiring in anticipation of later 
zone designation. Again, there is generally no statistically 
significant relationship between employment growth and 
enterprise zone designation.
With respect to employment, our results are similar 
whether or not we include the control rings, which sug-
gests that spillover effects are not causing us to understate 
the effectiveness of the program. If the enterprise zone 
program has spillovers, by which we mean that the pro-
gram encourages employment growth not only within the 
zone but also just outside the zone, then our methodology 
could find no effect of enterprise zones, since we estimate 
the effect by comparing growth of zones with growth in 
immediately neighboring areas.34 By using two control 
groups—future expansion areas and control rings—we can 
assess whether spillovers color our results. Future expan-
sion areas are closer geographically and in their economic 
conditions to current enterprise zone areas than control 
rings are, so any spillover effects should be greater in 
future expansion areas than in control rings. Had we found 
no employment effect only when using future expansion 
areas and a positive employment effect using control rings, 
then it would be possible that zones create positive spill-
over effects in neighboring areas. Since our results with 
and without control rings are similar, we discount the pos-
sibility of positive spillover effects.35 
Another possibility is that there are negative spillover 
effects, with enterprise zones pulling jobs and businesses 
away from nearby areas. The similarity of results with and 
without control rings also undermines this possibility. 
NOTES: Estimates are of the first-differenced form of equation (1) in Technical Appendix C, with four leads 
and eight lags of enterprise zone dummy variable added. The estimated lead effects are displayed to the 
left of zero, i.e., before enterprise zone designation at time zero, and the lagged effects are displayed to 
the right. The numbers on the horizontal axis indicate years before (negative numbers) or after (positive 
numbers) zone designation.
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Moreover, such negative spillovers would tend to produce 
evidence that enterprise zones do encourage job growth 
relative to control areas. Thus, if there were negative spill-
overs, our conclusion that there are no positive employ-
ment effects would only be reinforced. 
In addition to enterprise zones, other programs offer 
incentives for job creation in targeted geographic areas. 
The most important of these in terms of our analysis are 
redevelopment areas, because they are urban and very 
pervasive and hence are more likely to overlap with our 
enterprise zones, in which case there is the potential for 
confounding the effects of the two.36 In addition, three 
federal programs—Renewal Communities, Enterprise 
Communities, and Empowerment Zones—have a variety 
of similar benefits. These are listed and described in Tech-
nical Appendix B. We mapped redevelopment areas and 
federal zones digitally, overlaid these with our enterprise 
zone maps, and repeated our analysis. 
In all of the estimations, the estimated effects of 
enterprise zones in areas that do not overlap with redevel-
opment areas or federal zones are small and statistically 
insignificant. In addition, there is no evidence that enter-
prise zones have positive effects when they are combined 
with these other local programs.37 We conclude, therefore, 
that our estimated effects of enterprise zones are not mate-
rially affected by whether or not a particular region is also 
in a redevelopment area or a federal zone. 
Furthermore, the enterprise zone program has no 
effect on two measures of the composition of employment— 
the share of employment in low-wage industries and the 
share of employment in manufacturing. We examined 
these two measures, because enterprise zones are intended 
to help create jobs for those who are economically dis-
advantaged and likely to be low-skilled, and some of the 
enterprise zone benefits targeted on machinery and prop-
erty are most likely to benefit manufacturing enterprises.38 
These results are presented and described in Technical 
Appendix D.
Variation in Program Ef fectiveness 
Given the heterogeneity of local economies in which  
zones are located, the effects of the program’s incentives 
could in fact differ across zones, even though the incentives  
offered to businesses are the same, regardless of the zones 
in which the businesses are located. For example, some of 
the tax incentives may be more beneficial to manufactur-
ing firms, so that zones established in manufacturing areas 
might have more beneficial effects on employment. Or the 
program might have different effects in different zones 
because local administrators can influence the program’s 
effectiveness. Localities are encouraged to provide eco-
nomic development strategies in the process of applying 
for zone designation, and much of the program’s admin-
istration is left to local managers. Recent reform of the 
enterprise zone program places more emphasis on local 
management and local commitment.39
To assess whether local commitment to the program 
affects employment changes in zones, we conducted a 
survey of program administrators.40 We asked them 
open-ended qualitative questions about their views on 
the purpose of the enterprise zone program, if they evalu-
ate the program’s effectiveness, and what their biggest 
successes and challenges have been. We asked detailed 
questions about how the local zone tries to maximize the 
effectiveness of the program, and we received quantitative 
responses to the following questions:
On a 1–5 scale, where 1 means “not at all active” and  
5 means “extremely active,” how active is your zone in doing 
each of the following?
1. Using marketing—for instance, informing businesses 
about the zone and the incentives it offers; 
The enterprise zone program has  
no effect on the share of employment  
in low-wage industries or the  
share of employment in manufacturing. 
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2. Amending zoning or other local regulations to favor 
growth in your zone;
3. Training workers to make them qualified candidates 
or operating hiring centers to match individuals with 
businesses;
4. Facilitating the earning of tax credits—for example, by 
hosting informational sessions with business owners or 
employees;
5. Encouraging the building of additional infrastructure, 
such as a bus line or freeway spur; and 
6. Offering other tax incentives, credits, or discounts on 
public services at the local level.
We included these quantitative assessments in our 
analysis. Of course, it would have been ideal to have gath-
ered historical information about zone activities from the 
original dates of zone designation to the last year covered 
by the data, but this was not feasible. Some respondents 
have worked as zone administrators for as little as a few 
months, and their responses refer only to the very recent 
past and the present. On the other hand, many respon-
dents had several years of experience with their zone, 
some up to 20 years. Thus, the responses we received rep-
resent a mix of recent and long-term views and behaviors. 
Nonetheless, these surveys do provide insight into local 
zone activities.41 
Among the six activities we asked about, local zone 
administrators said they were most active using market-
ing and facilitating the earning of tax credits, which both 
received average scores of 4.0 on the 1–5 scale.42 The next 
highest scores were, in order, offering other tax incentives, 
credits, or discounts (2.9); training workers or operating 
hiring centers (2.8); encouraging infrastructure building 
(2.3); and amending zoning or other local regulations (1.6). 
Zones differed in their self-reported scores: The aver-
age score across all six activities ranged from 4.3 for an 
urban zone in Southern California to 1.2 in a rural zone. 
In general, the larger and more urban zones are more 
likely to facilitate earning tax credits and to offer other tax 
incentives, credits, or discounts on public services, and less 
likely to encourage building additional infrastructure.43 
We also found that enterprise zones face diverse chal-
lenges. We asked zone administrators what their biggest 
challenge was in attracting businesses or raising employ-
ment. Since our question was open-ended, the answers are 
not easily quantified, but it was clear that no single chal-
lenge dominates. Three challenges were mentioned repeat-
edly. The first was a lack of resources for marketing and 
outreach. In our 36 interviews, six respondents mentioned 
this constraint, including both small and large zones and 
urban and rural zones. Second was a lack of available land 
for new businesses, which was mentioned most often by 
more dense, urban zones, especially in Southern Califor-
nia. Third were geographic isolation and a lack of trans-
portation infrastructure, which was a common response 
among rural zones in the central and northern parts of the 
state. Other challenges, mentioned less frequently, include 
inadequacies in the local workforce, environmental and 
other regulations restricting growth, and the program’s 
benefits being too small to compete with larger incentives 
offered in other states. Finally, several administrators noted 
that small businesses in their zones often find the adminis-
trative requirements too burdensome; they do not have the 
time or money to get the help they need to complete hiring 
voucher requests and gather required data.
At the same time, a couple of common themes 
emerged across the interviews. When asked if they mea-
sure the effect of local enterprise zone activities on busi-
ness creation or employment, the majority cited counting 
vouchers for the enterprise zone’s hiring credit as the 
primary evaluation method (which is required by the 
In general, the larger and more urban zones  
are more likely to facilitate earning  
tax credits and to offer other tax incentives, 
credits, or discounts on public services,  
and less likely to encourage building  
additional infrastructure. 
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state). A few administrators mentioned attempts to count 
new business permits and employment changes and to 
keep track of business inquiries about the program, site 
visits, and other marketing outreach. But the primary data-
collection effort is counting vouchers, which is a measure 
of resources going into the program rather than a measure 
of the program’s effectiveness. 
Another common theme is that nearly every zone 
administrator had a similar view about the purpose of the 
enterprise zone program: to create jobs and to attract and 
retain businesses. When we asked respondents to state 
the primary goal of the program, nearly all mentioned 
job growth; far fewer also explicitly mentioned reduc-
ing unemployment or poverty. Representative answers 
included:
•	 “To	stimulate	jobs	and	investment	in	economically	dis-
advantaged areas of the state.”
•	 “To	help	the	local	economy	by	giving	local	businesses	a	
means to expand, and to encourage new firms to enter 
their area instead of a competing area.”
•	 “The	program	is	a	business	attraction	and	retention	tool.	
It’s the only statewide program we have.”
•	 “To	make	California	competitive	against	other	states	and	
regions in terms of manufacturing. Enterprise zones are 
the only incentive that they really have left.”
To assess how program effects differ across zones, we 
augment our regression model, described in Technical 
Appendix C, with self-reported scores, on a 1–5 scale, of 
the six zone activities. As before, we consider the effects of 
the program on both employment levels and employment 
When we asked respondents to state  
the primary goal of the program,  
nearly all mentioned job growth;  
far fewer also explicitly mentioned reducing 
unemployment or poverty. 
growth. We find that enterprise zones have a positive effect 
on employment under each of the following conditions:
•	 Manufacturing	constitutes	a	smaller	share	of	overall	
zone employment.
•	 Zone	administrators	report	doing	more	local	zone	mar-
keting activities. 
•	 Zone	administrators	report	doing	less	facilitation	of	
earning tax credits.
Specifically, we simulated the effect of the program on 
employment for a hypothetical zone that is average on all 
of our measures, except for having different manufactur-
ing shares and different self-reported levels of activities 
devoted to marketing or facilitating earning tax credits. 
We report results in Table 7. In zones with either a smaller 
share of manufacturing employment, more local zone 
marketing activities, or less facilitation of earning tax cred-
its, the effect of the enterprise zone on employment levels 
(shown in the table) and on employment growth rates (not 
shown) is positive and statistically significant.
In one sense, it is surprising that enterprise zones have 
a stronger positive effect on employment when the zone 
is less manufacturing-heavy, since some of the tax incen-
tives that the program offers, such as the sales tax credit for 
machinery, should benefit manufacturing firms more than 
firms in other industries. The program might be less effec-
tive in these areas because manufacturing firms are often 
the target of other economic development efforts. The site-
location decisions of automobile plants, for instance, get 
considerable public attention. A couple of the zone manag-
ers we surveyed noted that their biggest challenge was that 
program benefits are small relative to the incentives offered 
by other states and localities. Although their comments 
may not be representative of all of California’s enterprise 
zones, they point out that the enterprise zone program is 
only one tool that economic developers use to attract and 
retain businesses. Even if the enterprise zone program 
offers incentives that should appeal to manufacturing more 
than to other sectors, the competition for manufacturing 
jobs may be stiffer than for other jobs, and enterprise zone 
benefits may therefore matter less for manufacturing firms. 
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Another possibility is that for manufacturing industries, 
some of the other enterprise zone benefits focused on prop-
erty and machinery are more important; because these 
subsidize capital rather than labor, they could encourage a 
shift from labor to capital, offsetting the positive employ-
ment effects that the hiring credit might create. 
The evidence that activities focused on the hiring tax 
credit reduce the job-creating effects of enterprise zones is 
unexpected. One possible interpretation is that these activ-
ities focus more on claiming the tax credits retroactively 
than on creating jobs currently. Tax credits can be claimed 
retroactively for up to four years, and a substantial share  
of enterprise zone tax credits are claimed retroactively 
(California Budget Project, 2006a). It is also clear from 
perusing the Internet that many tax-service companies 
advertise their ability to help businesses in California 
receive tax reductions for the credits retroactively.44 Crit-
ics of enterprise zones point to this retroactive activity 
as evidence that the zone benefits do not help create jobs: 
“By definition, retroactive credits provide bonuses for 
past actions, but do not encourage businesses to increase 
or maintain employment in future years and thus do not 
further program goals” (California Budget Project, 2006a, 
p. 13). Retroactive claiming of credits despite little job  
creation can occur if firms do not know initially about  
the hiring credit. However, another possibility is that firms 
may know about and respond to the credit but file retroac-
tively only once they earn profits or once the “load” is large 
enough to justify the costs of filing. The behavior sur-
rounding tax credits is difficult to pin down. But our esti-
mates indicating that zones focusing on these credits are 
less effective at creating jobs might provide some evidence 
in favor of the more critical view of how the hiring tax 
credit gets used (i.e., that some of the activities surround-
ing the hiring credit focus more on retroactive credits than 
on creating jobs contemporaneously).45 
Of the local activities we asked zone administrators 
about in our survey, only marketing and outreach efforts 
improved the program’s effect on employment. Current 
zone application procedures require that localities formu-
late a marketing plan, and marketing and outreach efforts 
are the activities that zone managers are most likely to say 
they do. We caution, however, that we are measuring zone 
managers’ own perceptions of local marketing and out-
reach efforts. It is possible that managers view themselves 
as more active in marketing and outreach after observ-
ing positive employment effects in their zones, in which 
case the self-assessment of marketing activity could be the 
Characteristic Zone effect on employment Statistically significant?
Manufacturing share 5% of employment  
(zone average = 15%) 0.201 Yes
Manufacturing share 25% of employment  
(zone average = 15%) –0.143 No
Self-reported marketing effort 5 on 1–5 scale  
(zone average = 4) 0.166 Yes
Self-reported marketing effort 3 on 1–5 scale  
(zone average = 4) –0.150 No
Facilitating the earning of tax credits effort 5 on 1–5 scale 
(zone average = 4) –0.044 No
Facilitating the earning of tax credits effort 3 on 1–5 scale 
(zone average = 4) 0.202 Yes
NOTES: Estimates are reported for a hypothetical zone that is average on all our measures (see Technical Appendix D, Table A.8, for the full list) except the listed zone characteristic. The effect of the zone on the 
employment levels (measured as the natural log of employment) is based on regression coefficient estimates shown in Technical Appendix D, Table A.9, column 5, and includes control rings. Statistical significance 
is reported at the 5 percent level.
Table 7. Hypothetical zone characteristics and zone effect on employment estimated
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Of the local activities we asked zone 
administrators about in our survey,  
only marketing and outreach efforts improved 
the program’s effect on employment. 
meant to increase employment, some of the benefits target-
ing machinery and property could lead to substitution away 
from labor. This might also explain why manufacturing-
heavy zones show no positive employment effect, since 
manufacturing firms rely more than other firms on capital 
and land. 
A second possibility is that the program shifts hiring  
toward “disadvantaged workers” (as defined by the pro-
gram) without an overall net increase in employment. 
Because the eligibility standards for using the hiring credit 
favor lower-wage workers and because the hiring credit is 
capped at a low salary level, the program’s benefits should 
reduce the cost of hiring lower-wage, disadvantaged work-
ers relative to hiring higher-wage workers. We cannot 
directly assess this possibility because the NETS data-
base reports the industry of an establishment but not the 
specific occupations or earnings of workers employed in 
that establishment, nor the skill levels or other indicators 
of the socioeconomic disadvantage of these workers. Our 
analysis shows no compositional shift toward lower-wage 
industries, but that does not rule out a shift toward disad-
vantaged workers within firms in each industry.
We reject some other explanations for the lack of 
effect as implausible. One hypothetical explanation could 
be that the program results in higher wages for workers 
despite failing to increase employment. However, econom-
ics research has clearly established that higher wages entice 
workers to enter the labor market (i.e., labor supply is “elas-
tic”), so it is highly unlikely that the program raised wages 
without increasing employment.46 A second claim we find 
implausible is that the incentive effect of the program is 
weak. Dividing the cost of the program ($330 million in 
2005) by the number of jobs in enterprise zones (roughly 
1.4 million) yields an estimate of about $240 per worker— 
a small amount. However, for workers whom firms can 
claim for the hiring tax credit, the program offers subsi-
dies of up to 50 percent of a low-income worker’s wages—
hardly a small incentive. 
A secondary finding is that average establishment 
size may grow in enterprise zones. Increasing establish-
ment size is consistent with survey respondents’ comments 
result of employment growth rather than a contributor. 
We also caution that we are asking current zone managers 
about their recent marketing efforts, whereas our analysis  
of employment effects looks at the period 1992–2004. Thus, 
we are implicitly assuming that a zone’s self-reported mar-
keting efforts today are a useful indicator of its marketing 
efforts in the past. This finding, though, supports the 2006 
reforms to the enterprise zone program that placed more 
emphasis on local activities and local commitment in the 
belief that more effort on local marketing and outreach 
might lead to more positive employment effects.
Conclusions 
California’s enterprise zone program—the state’s largest  
economic development program—has no statistically 
significant effect on employment. We arrived at this con-
clusion after mapping nearly all businesses in the state, 
drawing precise enterprise zone boundaries, and compar-
ing employment growth in enterprise zones with carefully 
considered control areas. 
The lack of an effect on employment is surprising. 
Employment growth is an explicit goal of the program and, 
according to our survey, is the main focus of local zone 
managers. We do not assess, as others have, the effect of 
the program on unemployment or poverty, but it is difficult 
to see how these outcomes could improve in the absence  
of a positive effect on employment. 
Why might there be no effect on employment? One 
possible reason is that even though the incentives are 
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that smaller businesses find it less worthwhile than larger 
businesses to claim enterprise zone benefits because of the 
administrative burden.48 Another possibility is that higher 
prices for land relative to other inputs lead employers to 
substitute toward other inputs, including labor. 
The absence of evidence of a beneficial effect of Cali-
fornia’s enterprise zones on job and business creation 
clearly calls into question whether the state should con-
tinue to grant enterprise zone tax incentives. Finding no 
overall employment effects, the burden of proof shifts to 
identifying other positive effects, if any, or redesigning 
the program to focus on zones where positive effects are 
most likely. We have already mentioned why it is unlikely 
that the program raises wages for workers in the absence 
of employment increases. Another possible effect of the 
program, which we did not analyze in this study, is that 
enterprise zone benefits could be capitalized into land  
values, because the benefits accrue to businesses in speci-
fied geographic areas. This could happen if commercial 
landlords, knowing that businesses benefit from the enter-
prise zone tax incentives, raise commercial rents enough 
to offset enterprise zone benefits, leaving a business in a 
zone no better or worse off than before an area became 
part of an enterprise zone. However, capitalization would 
not explain the lack of effect on employment. Even if land 
values rise, reductions in the relative cost of labor owing to 
the hiring credit still imply that employers will hire more 
labor relative to other inputs. 
Our research may have some useful implications for 
making enterprise zones more effective. First, although 
we find that the enterprise zone program on average has 
no effect on employment, we found some evidence that 
the program’s effectiveness differs across zones. Several 
local factors appear to be correlated with the effectiveness 
of the program: Zones with smaller employment shares 
in manufacturing, zones where the administrators report 
greater marketing and outreach activity, and zones where 
administrators report expending less effort on facilitating 
the earning of tax credits all had a more positive effect on 
employment than other zones. The recent program reforms 
requiring greater local responsibility and commitment are 
consistent with our findings that local efforts—at least in 
regard to marketing—raise program effectiveness. There 
could be other factors—either initial zone conditions or 
local activities—that we did not study that also influence 
the effectiveness of the program. And, as the enterprise zone 
program is increasingly designed to leverage formulation 
of local economic development strategies, the state should 
look closely at which local strategies are more effective than 
others. Selecting future zones based on factors that make the 
program more effective would, of course, raise the overall 
effectiveness of the program. (The text box offers some tech-
nical suggestions on how to define zones geographically to 
make evaluation and assessments more feasible.)
To increase the overall effect of the program on 
employment, zones could be selected or allowed to expire, 
depending on their effectiveness. This would represent a 
change from current practices in which we see minimal 
Recommendations for improving the program 
Two relatively small changes to the program would make 
future evaluation and administration of the program much 
more simple. The first would be to require that local zone 
administrators and applicants create digitized maps of their 
zones using GIS software. GIS maps can be read with standard 
mapping software and overlaid with data from the U.S. Cen-
sus, the NETS, and other sources. 
 The second change would be to require that enterprise 
zones follow Census tract boundaries. This would make it 
easier to analyze and control for demographic and other 
characteristics when selecting new zones or evaluating exist-
ing ones. It would also make zone boundaries more defini-
tive. Currently, conflicting information in different maps and 
street lists leads to some cases of ambiguity about whether 
individual streets are part of an enterprise zone. 
 Taken together, these two recommendations—requiring 
digitized maps and following Census tract boundaries—
would allow local administrators, local businesses, and HCD 
to definitively analyze the demographics and other charac-
teristics of zones, so long as the Census continues to produce 
usable tract-level data.47 These improvements would aid HCD 
in the selection and evaluation processes and could help local 
administrators work with businesses to visualize and market 
the zone.
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in the East San Fernando Valley—was combined with 
the Central Los Angeles/Hollywood zone, resulting in 
an application process that designated every applicant as 
an enterprise zone or part of another zone.50 In January 
2008, eight more zones (out of a pool of 13 applicants) were 
designated to replace another round of expiring zones; of 
these eight, seven were in jurisdictions previously declared 
as enterprise zones. 
We encourage a more critical evaluation of the pro-
gram overall and of its effects in individual zones, using 
both our metric—employment—and others—such as 
poverty, unemployment, and property values. Although we 
believe that the state’s recent decision to encourage more 
local marketing efforts will probably increase the positive 
effect of the program on employment, the state should 
evaluate individual zone success with consistent evalua-
tion metrics. The 2006 enterprise zone reform called for 
more individually tailored evaluation metrics to be applied 
zone by zone. Although zone-specific goals may encourage 
local commitment to the program, consistent evaluation 
metrics are essential for judging which factors make some 
zones more effective than others. Zones that show no posi-
tive effects should be allowed to expire to make room for 
applicant zones exhibiting the characteristics that lead to 
positive employment effects.
Our findings cast a skeptical eye on California’s enter-
prise zone program. For a cash-strapped state, it is too 
costly a program to simply continue with “business as 
usual” without clearer evidence of the program’s benefits or 
a well-defined plan to make the program more effective. ●
turnover in enterprise zones. All of the zones designated 
before 1990 were granted five-year extensions when they 
reached the end of their original 15-year terms. No enter-
prise zone in the state has ever been de-designated for poor 
audit results or for any other reason, and the Assembly 
committee responsible for oversight calls the performance 
reviews “very rudimentary.”49 Furthermore, the recent 
major application round, in 2006, was effectively non-
selective. Because of the large number of zones created in 
1986 (and that received five-year extensions) and another 
wave of zones created in 1991 and 1992 (that had yet to be 
extended), 23 of the 42 zones expired in 2006 and 2007. 
In 2006, 19 of the 23 expiring zones re-applied for a new 
15-year term, and six new areas applied for eligibility in the 
program. Two of the 25 applicants—Central Los Angeles 
and Hollywood—were combined into a single application, 
and out of the resulting 24 applicants, HCD designated 
23 new zones. Then, the one zone not selected—Pacoima 
All technical appendices to this report  
are available on the PPIC website:  
www.ppic.org/content/pubs/other/609JKR_appendix.pdf. 
The absence of evidence of a beneficial effect  
of California’s enterprise zones  
on job and business creation clearly calls  
into question whether the state should continue 
to grant enterprise zone tax incentives.
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Notes
1 California Budget Project (2006a) and Bradshaw (2003).
2 Of this total, $197 million in hiring and sales or use tax credits 
was claimed on corporate tax returns, and $136 million on per-
sonal income tax returns. Additional, smaller incentives that the 
enterprise zone program offers should also count as part of the 
program’s costs but they are not listed separately as tax expendi-
tures by the Franchise Tax Board.
3 CALED proposed extending zone benefits to businesses in any 
city or county in California with unemployment above the state 
average.
4 Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy 
Committee (2006, p. 5).
5 Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy 
Committee (2006). 
6 Specifically, our study looks at the effects of enterprise zones on 
jobs and businesses inside the zones. It does not assess evidence 
on the effects on residents of the enterprise zones or of targeted 
employment areas, for reasons explained below.
7 The eligibility of residents in TEAs for the hiring credit began 
in 1997. Enterprise zones are defined by individual street 
addresses. TEAs are defined by Census tracts. TEAs typically 
include parts of an enterprise zone itself and other lower-income 
neighborhoods, but they are defined independently of enterprise 
zones and do not necessarily overlap them. A worker living in 
a TEA qualifies for the hiring credit regardless of other indi-
vidual worker characteristics. TEAs include Census tracts where 
more than half the population earns less than 80 percent of the 
median area income, according to the 1980 Census (personal 
communication, Richard Friedman, former Deputy Director, 
Division of Financial Assistance, Department of Housing and 
Community Development, October 2006). 
8 It appears that very few workers claim this credit—fewer than 
500 in 2005, for a total cost of just over $100,000 (California 
Franchise Tax Board, 2006). Although technically this credit is 
given to the worker, economic theory teaches us that the inci-
dence of the tax credit is independent of who receives it. As long 
as labor supply is not completely inelastic, market wages will fall 
(although wages plus the credit will rise) and employment will 
increase. 
9 Firms in enterprise zones receive “a five-percent preference for 
state contracts in excess of $100,000” (Assembly Jobs, Economic 
Development, and the Economy Committee, 2006, p. 13).
10 Technical Appendix E explains issues regarding obtaining the 
required information.
11 We refer to “Los Angeles” as if the five enterprise zones in Los 
Angeles were a single zone. We explain in Technical Appendix B  
that we were able to determine whether a business was in any of 
the five Los Angeles enterprise zones but not which one, so for 
the purposes of our study we treat the Los Angeles zones as a 
single zone.
12 Note that some numbers repeat in column 3. This occurs when 
there are multiple zones in the same county. 
13 In our work and in academic research on employment dynam-
ics, a “firm” is a legal entity that can include one or more “estab-
lishments,” which are physical locations where a firm conducts 
business and has at least one employee. 
14 Descriptive statistics in columns 2–4 are based on 1992 
employment for the areas that are or will become part of an 
enterprise zone by 2004. Data are from the NETS. Ideally we 
would describe zone characteristics before zone designation, 
so that we could characterize enterprise zones before they were 
affected by the policy. The best we can do is to use 1992 data, the 
earliest year for which the NETS has data of use for our analysis. 
15 Demographic data for counties come from the 1990 Census.
16 Despite this last criterion, we have discovered only one evalu-
ation of a specific enterprise zone, in Bakersfield (Lyman, 2001). 
However, this study does not establish any effect of the zone, 
as there is no comparison either with nonzone areas or with 
changes over periods before the zone designation. 
17 Curiously, though, residents of the distressed areas within 
enterprise zones are not eligible for the hiring credit unless these 
areas coincide with a TEA or they are in other eligible groups. 
18 Specifically, in the 2006 application process, an area was 
eligible if it met at least three of the following conditions: (1) the 
net increase in per capita income 1990–2004 was 80 percent or 
less of the statewide average, (2) average unemployment was at 
least 7.4 percent in both 2003 and 2004, (3) the personal poverty 
rate was at least 15.2 percent in 2000, (4) at least 70 percent of 
households had incomes below 80 percent of the median county 
family income in 2000, and (5) the area fell within a jurisdiction 
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declared a disaster area by the U.S. president within the last seven 
years. Areas not eligible by this definition could still “petition” as 
mentioned above. These 2006 criteria for eligibility are slightly 
different from those in previous rounds, but the general procedure 
of assessing a distressed residential area and combining it with a 
neighboring commercial or industrial area has not changed.
19 In the 2006 round of zone designation, applicants were scored 
and ranked on their economic development plan; the bulk of 
the score was derived from HCD’s assessments of the marketing 
strategy, the plans for financing and administering the program, 
local incentives, the infrastructure development plans, and 
information management. About one-quarter of the score was 
based on current conditions of the zone; this included the num-
ber of businesses, commercial and industrial vacancy rates, and 
available land, as well as unemployment and income levels. HCD 
assigned an aggregate score as well as scores for individual com-
ponents; information on all of these scores is publicly available. 
The application process is described in California Department of 
Housing and Community Development (2006).
20 Several studies were prepared in the years leading up to 2006, 
when the originally designated zones began to expire and new 
zones were to be designated.
21 This study was based on a companion academic paper by 
O’Keefe (2004), which we discuss in our review of the academic 
literature in Technical Appendix A.
22 The CAEZ is a nonprofit organization that acts as an advocate 
for enterprise zones. 
23 Bradshaw applies various average tax rates to convert employ-
ment changes into tax revenue changes. 
24 A more recent version of this study, covering more states 
(Ham et al., 2009), reports results for employment effects  
as well, and concludes that enterprise zone “designation in  
California has no significant effect on employment” (p. 2). 
Other results in this study are curious. First, the only state in 
which enterprise zones have detectable employment effects  
is Ohio, although in that state the hiring credit is trivial. Sec-
ond, for California, despite finding no employment effects, the 
study finds significant and positive effects on the fraction of 
households with wage and salary income. Conversely, in Ohio, 
despite the apparent strong employment effects, the study finds 
no effect on this fraction. 
25 California Budget Project (2006a, p. 11, and 2006b, p. 2). 
26 Bradshaw (2006) cites Potrero Hill in San Francisco as a prime 
example and references his 2003 cost-benefit analysis as evidence 
of the general effectiveness of the enterprise zone program. But 
he offers no specific evidence about the program’s effect on this 
neighborhood.
27 Geocoding (the conversion of street addresses or other des-
ignators to latitude-longitude coordinates) provides a common 
language that enables geographic information from different 
sources to be combined.
28 In our survey of local enterprise zone administrators, we asked 
why zones expanded and when and where they did. Two main 
reasons emerged. First, zones often expanded to benefit busi-
nesses that were moving to or growing in areas just outside the 
enterprise zone. Second, zones sometimes expanded to incor-
porate areas newly designated as commercial or industrial by 
the local planning process. To the extent that zones expanded 
where businesses planned to relocate or grow, zone expansions 
were sometimes the effect rather than the cause of employment 
growth. If so, our estimates of the effect of the enterprise zone 
program on employment would be biased upward. Since we 
ultimately find no effect on employment, this only strengthens 
our conclusions. 
29 We often do not observe the original designation of the zone 
in our sample period, which begins in 1992, even though most 
zones were originally designated earlier. Most of our identify-
ing information comes from expansions. Thus, interpreting our 
results as estimating “the” effects of enterprise zones hinges on 
the assumption that the effects of the original designations and 
expansions are the same. We test this assumption and find that 
the effects of the initial designation and expansion are indeed 
similar.
30 The hiring credit is largest in the first year and declines to 
zero after the fifth year of employment, which has the potential 
effect of encouraging the churning of employees so that a larger 
share of the workforce at any time qualifies for the hiring credit. 
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to track employees 
across business establishments, so there is no way to test directly 
for this possible effect, although it is an important issue for 
future research.
31 Ideally, we would like pre-treatment comparisons. However, 
many of the areas in the original zone designations were so 
designated before 1992, and there is no pre-treatment year for 
the control rings. 
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32 We ranked industries by average pay based on 2004 data from 
the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, dividing 
industry subsectors (as defined by the North American Indus-
trial Classification System) into three groups, each containing 
approximately one-third of the workforce. 
33 These data are weighted by the 1992 employment of the sub- 
zone. Unweighted, subzone employment grows faster after desig- 
nation than before. The weighted and unweighted results are 
different because smaller subzones grow faster after designation 
than before, and larger subzones grow slower after designa-
tion than before. The weighted estimates are more meaningful, 
because they reflect the overall effect of enterprise zone designa-
tion on jobs and establishments statewide.
34 Spillovers could stem from a number of potential sources, 
including increased retail “traffic,” rising incomes of nearby 
residents, and changes in infrastructure. 
35 Moreover, the estimates remain similar when we use larger 
control rings that extend 2,500 feet. 
36 Activities qualifying for redevelopment area benefits include the 
“rehabilitation/reconstruction of existing structures, the redesign/
replanning of areas with inefficient site layout, the demolition and  
clearance of existing structures, the construction/rehabilitation 
of affordable housing and the construction of public facilities 
including, but not limited to, public buildings, streets, sidewalks, 
sewers, storm drains, water systems, and street lights” (California 
Redevelopment Association, undated). Redevelopment is typically 
financed through tax-increment revenue.
37 Some evidence shows positive effects of redevelopment areas 
and federal zones. We do not emphasize these, however, as our 
research was not designed to assess the effects of these areas in 
the most definitive way. In particular, the comparison groups 
fall within either the enterprise zones or the rings around 
them, which are not necessarily the best comparison groups for 
estimating the effects of redevelopment areas or federal zones. 
Rather, the main purpose of this analysis is simply to distinguish 
between different “parts” of enterprise zone areas that may or 
may not overlap with redevelopment areas or federal zones. 
38 The NETS data do not allow us to determine anything about 
the particular workers employed by business establishments. 
However, we can determine whether there is a shift toward 
lower-paying industries.
39 California Assembly Bill 1550, enacted in 2006, updates 
standards for evaluation of enterprise zone performance, among 
other reforms. Insufficient local commitment to supporting the 
program, defined at the time of zone designation, is potentially 
grounds for de-designation (Arambula, 2008).
40 We conducted phone interviews in the spring and summer of 
2007, lasting typically 30–45 minutes. The survey was a mix of 
yes/no, 1–5 scales, and open-ended questions. We talked to 36 
zone managers; because some are responsible for multiple zones 
when these are in the same county, the 36 interviews covered all 
zones in the program listed in Table 1, as well as those we did 
not include in our quantitative analysis. We identified potential 
respondents from the list of enterprise zone contacts on the 
HCD website. We used a standardized survey instrument that 
included some quantitative and some open-ended questions. We 
promised respondents confidentiality.
41 Even if longitudinal data were available on questions such as 
those we asked, we would be skeptical about their reliability in 
tracking changes in what are, to a fairly large extent, subjective 
assessments of zone activities. 
42 The open-ended responses to the survey made it clear that 
“earning tax credits” referred to the hiring credit, so we adopt 
that narrow interpretation. 
43 The correlation of facilitating the earning of tax credits is 0.34 
(p = 0.10) with employment and 0.30 (p = 0.15) with zone employ-
ment density. The correlation of offering other tax incentives, 
credits, or discounts on public services is 0.33 (p = 0.12) with 
employment and 0.33 (p = 0.11) with zone density. The correlation 
of encouraging building additional infrastructure is –0.44  
(p = 0.03) with density and –0.35 (p = 0.09) with employment.
44 See, for example, Ernst & Young (undated); Enterprise Tax 
Services LLC (undated). 
45 There is also the possibility of “cross-vouchering,” whereby  
one zone helps businesses from other zones get vouchers for the 
hiring credit. According to California Budget Project (2006a), 
zone administrators charge for this, and some zones adopted 
lenient documentation standards; indeed, new regulations 
adopted in 2007 standardized the documentation requirements 
for vouchering (e.g., California CPA Magazine, 2008; Fine, 2007). 
Again, this cross-vouchering activity might have detracted from 
other efforts to boost zone employment, especially if the cross-
vouchering is focused on retroactive credits. 
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